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The purpose of the United States patent system is to balance the goals of 
“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” with “. . . securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”1 Congress has enacted the patent statutes2 in an effort to optimize the 
public benefit of encouraging investment into research and development against the 
social cost of granting to inventors exclusive rights to their inventions for 20 years.3  
As such, Congress has determined that an applicant must meet four criteria in order 
to overcome the general public policy against the granting of a monopoly—even if 
for only a limited time.  First, the invention must have utility.4  Second, the invention 
must be novel.5  Third, the invention must not be obvious in view of a person of 
ordinary skill in the art.6  Fourth, the invention must be fully described with 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2015). 
3 See generally STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG. 2D SESSION, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM (1958) (Fritz Machlup). 
4 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, through Act 2015) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.”). 
5 35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West , through Act 2015) (“(a) Novelty; prior art.--A person shall be 
entitled to a patent unless--(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in 
a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed 
published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, 
names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention....”). 
6 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West, through Act 2015) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be 
obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth 
in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that 
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of 
the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention 
was made.”). 
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specificity in an enabling disclosure.7 
 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) has been 
tasked by Congress with administering the day-to-day operation of examining patent 
applications, issuing patents, and reexamining existing patents.  In spite of this, the 
historic practice has been that Congress and the courts have denied the Patent Office 
the same rule making authority granted to other agencies under the Administrative 
Procedures Act8 to effectuate their mission.  With the passage of the America 
Invents Act9 and the decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,10 the 
Patent Office’s rule making authority makes a significant stride toward having the 
ability to interpret congressional statutes and be given deference by the courts for 
those interpretations similar to the deference given to other agencies. Although 
courts are typically considered the final arbiters to say what the law is,11 this 
proposition is in doubt when administrative agencies are able to promulgate their 
own rules; enforce those rules through agency actions; and adjudicate those cases in 
administrative proceedings. Because the Court chose not to reign in the Patent 
Office when it clearly went beyond its statutory authority, the courts are likely to 
defer to the Patent Office’s interpretation of patent issues going forward.12 
 This article explores the intersection of patent law and administrative rules, 
and the role of both agencies and courts in divining legislative intent viewed through 
a study of the decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee.13 First, this article 
explores the historical practice the Patent Office has played in administering the 
patent laws and the traditional view of Congress and the courts to deny the Patent 
Office substantive rule making authority.  Second, the origins of the Administrative 
Procedures Act and how its subsequent application has affected Patent Office 
practice is reviewed.  This includes a discussion of the seminal Supreme Court case 
interpreting the Administrative Procedures Act, because this seminal case, Chevron, 
                                                 
7 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West, through Act 2015) (“(a) In general.—The specification shall 
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and 
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out 
the invention . . . . ”). 
8 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2015). 
9 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
10 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
11See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
12 See infra part VII. 
13 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131. 
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,14 was cited as controlling 
precedent in deciding Cuozzo.  Before moving onto an in-depth discussion of 
Cuozzo, a comparison is made on one of the key points of contention in the case 
between the Patent Office’s claim construction standard which uses the broadest 
reasonable interpretation and the court’s claim construction standard which uses ‘as 
understood by those skilled in the art.’ With this back drop the Supreme Court 
decision in Cuozzo is discussed in detail.  Lastly, an analysis of the impact of the 
Cuozzo decision is made and an analysis of whether or not the courts will continue 
to give deference to Patent Office interpretations of congressional intent or will 
return the historical practice of leaving the interpretation of the core patent statutes 
to the courts. 
 
II. THE PATENT OFFICE HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN GRANTED ONLY A LIMITED 
ABILITY TO PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES 
 
 Many of the principles and fundamental doctrines surrounding patent 
rights were firmly established well before the Patent Office came into being. For 
example, patent rights were granted throughout the colonies in the new world even 
prior to the establishment of the federal patent system.15  The ability of the United 
States government to grant letters patent and copyrights were then subsequently 
incorporated into the United States Constitution.16  Initially, patents were granted 
solely through an act of Congress and not through the executive branch.17 This 
quickly became overly cumbersome for Congress to decide on the merits of every 
patent application.18 Thus, Congress delegated this duty to the executive branch 
through the first Patent Act of 1790.19 The first Act spelled out in great detail how 
the executive branch was to carry out its duties regarding patents including who 
specifically was to examine the patent applications and how they were to decide 
                                                 
14 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 
15 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents 
(5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 615, 615-16 (1996). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
17 The ability of a patent applicant to receive a patent through a private bill submitted to 
congress is still available, but is rarely used anymore. See, e.g., Devin Dwyer, Looking for a 
Bailout? Just Call Your Congressman, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/congress-private-laws-bailout-americans-special-
cases/story?id=8995047. 
18 P.J. Frederico, The Patent Act of 1793, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 77 (1936) (SPECIAL ISSUE). 
19 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
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which patents met the Act’s provisions. These specifics left very little discretion to 
the executive branch as to how to administrate the patent system. This slowly 
changed over time with Congress deferring more and more responsibility to the 
executive branch in determining how best to administer the patent system at least 
regarding internal procedural matters. This is illustrated by the subsequent history 
of the Patent Office.  
 The first Patent Act passed in 179020 was replaced by a somewhat longer 
and more detailed Act in 1793.21  One of the first provisions to be changed was the 
designation of who would be able to grant a patent. Because the process of 
examination was so intensive, it did not make sense to burden top level cabinet 
officials such as the Secretary of the Department of War with this work.22 This 
onerous examination process combined with the omission of the requirement of 
“sufficiently useful” caused the patent system to effectively move from a patent 
examination system to a patent registration system for a time.23 Another change in 
the Patent Act of 1793 gave the executive branch the discretion, without direct 
congressional oversight, to appoint a Superintendent of the Patent Office.24 As the 
case load of patent examinations increased, the Patent Office eventually became a 
separate agency under the Superintendent within the Department of State.25 
Nonetheless, a number of provisions from these early acts have survived in the 
modern patent statutes to this day including: the patenting of inventions that were 
not previously known or used; limiting patents to the first inventor; a system of 
judicial remedies for infringement; and the requirement of disclosure.26 As the 
number of applications increased so did the need for the Patent Office to adopt 
standard procedures for handling the increased workload. 
                                                 
20 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting A 
Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445 (1997). 
21 Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).  
22 Compare Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (“[I]t shall and may be lawful to and for 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General, or 
any two of them, if they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and 
important, to cause letters patent to be made out.”), with Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) 
(“[I]t shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made 
out.”); see Lawrence C. Kingsland, The United States Patent Office, 13 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 354–57 (Spring 1948), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol13/iss2/8. 
23 Kingsland, supra note 22, at 357. 
24 Id. at 358. 
25 Id.  
26 1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:18 (4th ed.) (Jan. 2016). 
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 These earlier Acts were repealed and replaced in 1836, and further added 
to by the 1839 amendments, which introduced some new provisions to the 
substantive patent laws at that time.27  For example, one of the major changes was 
to move away from the de facto patent registration system that had been established 
back to an application and examination system where the Superintendent of the 
Patent Office was to issue patents only to applications that met the statutory 
requirement of validity.28  This was done because many inventors were apparently 
abusing the system by registering invalid patents as a means of asserting frivolous 
                                                 
27 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
28 Id. at sec. 7. For example, a letter sent by Mr. C. W. Peale illustrates the informal nature of 
the registration system of patents prior to this change in a letter sent to William Thornton, the 
Superintendent of the Patent Office during this time: 
Dear Sir, 
 On my return form the head of the Chesapeake I find that my 
son Rubens had received the papers respecting Mr. Hawkins’ Patent right 
of the Polygraph and Physionotrace accompanied with your letter of the 
27 Ult. For which please to accept my thanks— 
 I have further to request of you, that he enclosed transferred 
right of the use of the Physiognotrace in the City of Philadelphia made to 
me, may be recorded in the secretary of States Office and then to be 
returned here immediately, with a certificate under the seal of office of 
its being recorded.  This ought to have been done sooner, which my want 
of knowledge of the Law made me neglect, but my Lawer [sic] advises it 
now, and wishes to have them before he commences the suit.  I do not 
love law suits, yet something must b3 [sic] done to prevent unjust men 
from robing me of my privileges. 
 I contemplate a small Tour in Europe as soon as I can arrange 
some family affairs, but most particularly to settle some exchanges with 
the Paris Museum, and to dispose of a Skeleton of the mammoth, a 
business my Son Rembrandt ought to have done before his return to 
America.  My respectful complements to the family, with due respect 
your friend. 
       
  C W Peale 
Papers relating to the administration of the U.S. Patent Office during the superintendency of 
William Thornton, 1802–1828, (compiled and edited by C.M. Harris, Daniel Preston) (May 
21, 1805). 
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patent infringement claims.29 In response, the Patent Office began to assert its 
authority regarding various procedural matters.30 One of the congressional 
compromises in passing the Act introduced a new provision that allowed a grace 
period in which patentees had to file a patent application before the invention was 
deemed to have been abandoned and relegated to the public domain, rendering the 
invention unpatentable.31 During the ensuing years, the Superintendent of the Patent 
Office title was replaced and changed to the Commissioner of the Patent Office and 
the Patent Office began to promulgate its own procedural rules for examining patent 
applications.32 
 Additional substantive changes were introduced by Congress in the Patent 
Act of 1870 including the requirement that an inventor disclose the best mode of 
carrying out the invention33 and including a change to the justification for the 
presence of the grace period, from an inventor’s subjective abandonment to a system 
based on laches.34 The Patent Office introduced some additional changes of its own 
during this time relating to how patents were to be examined internally. For 
example, recognizing the imprecision in language, by applicants, in the language 
being used when claiming an invention, the Patent Office now required peripheral 
claiming rather than central claiming in order for the patent applicant to be 
                                                 
29 Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (“Exactions and frauds, 
in all the forms which rapacity can suggest, are daily imposed and practised under the 
pretence [sic] of some legal sanction. The most frivolous and useless alterations in articles in 
common use are denominated improvements, and made pretexts for increasing their prices, 
while all complaint and remonstrance are effectually resisted by an exhibition of the great 
seal. . . . Impositions of this sort, are of common occurrence, and will continue to multiply 
while the door to imposture is left open and unguarded.”). 
30 See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 224 (1832) (“[T]he executive departments, it is 
understood, have acted on the construction adopted by the circuit court, and have 
considered it as settled. We would not willingly disregard the settled practice, in a case 
where we are not satisfied it is contrary to law; and where we are satisfied it is required by 
justice and good faith.”). 
31 Patent Act of 1839, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839). 
32 For example, the Commissioner of the Patent Office, at this time Edmund Burke, 
submitted an opinion penned by the Secretary of State directly to the Supreme Court in 
support of his examination decision. Bain v. Morse, 2 F. Cas. 394, 402 (C.C.D.D.C. 1849) 
(“I have the honor to reply to your letter submitting an inquiry propounded by the 
commissioner of patents.”). 
33 Patent Act of 1870, § 26, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). 
34 See, e.g., The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 627, 627 (1887). 
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successful.35 Notably, the Act gave the Patent Office the explicit statutory authority 
to promulgate its own rules for the first time, but limited the ability to only include 
proceedings within the Patent Office.36 
 The Patent Act of 1952 essentially codified the existing patent laws into 
Title 35 of the United States Code.37 One of the most significant changes to the 
patent statutes was the express addition of the section regarding anticipation.38  In 
order to overcome the anticipation requirement for patentability, one’s invention 
could not have been obvious to one skilled in the art.39 Although the Patent Office 
had some authority to promulgate its own rules,40 many patent law issues remained 
under Congress’s purview, including areas such as fee setting, where the agency 
arguably was in a much better position than Congress to determine appropriate 
fees.41 
 In 1982, Congress enacted legislation to move appellate review for 
infringement cases from the regional circuit courts of appeal to the newly formed 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.42 The new court was also granted 
jurisdiction to take appeals directly from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.43  This allowed the same judicial 
                                                 
35 See 1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:21 (4th ed.) (Jan. 2016); see, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 
56 U.S. 62, 62 (1853) (displaying both peripheral and central claiming styles).  The Supreme 
Court condoned the Patent Office’s change through a series of holdings. See, e.g., Merrill v. 
Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1876) (“The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a 
century in this country has reached a stage in its progress where the variety and magnitude of 
the interests involved require accuracy, precision, and care in the preparation of all the papers 
on which the patent is founded.”). 
36 Patent Act of 1870, § 19 (1870) (“[The Commissioner], subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time establish rules and regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of the proceedings in the patent office.”). 
37 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (July 19, 1952). 
38 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). 
39 Id. 
40 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 6, 66 Stat. 792, 793 (July 19, 1952). 
41 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 41, 66 Stat. 792, 796 (July 19, 1952). 
42 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); 
17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
4101 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., Bray v. United States, 785 F.2d 989, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(discussing merits of Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit). 
43 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
4104 (3d ed. 2016); see, e.g., In re Voss, 557 F.2d 812 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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body to now have judicial review of both infringement cases and review of the initial 
administrative decision to grant a patent.44  These review functions had been 
judicially isolated for about 150 years and, thus, had diverged on some matters of 
substantive law.45 
 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg was one of the key decisions after 
the establishment of the new Federal Circuit.46 Although the Federal Circuit ruled 
in favor of the USPTO the language the court used was actually seen to curtail the 
Patent Office’s rule making authority.47 This was explicitly emphasized in Merck & 
Co. v. Kessler.48 The court declined to accept the Patent Office Commissioner’s 
argument that the office’s decision should be given “controlling weight”49 under 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,50 and determined 
that the Patent Office lacked the authority to promulgate any substantive rules.51 
Therefore, even though the Patent Office was given the authority to enact some 
                                                 
44 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 43, at n.25. 
45 See, e.g., In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the USPTO did 
not use the legally correct method for determining obviousness); In re Donaldson Co., Inc., 
16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that the USPTO imposed an improper 
obviousness rejection). 
46 See generally Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
47 Id. at 931. (“[T]he Commissioner's Notice falls within the ‘interpretative’ exception to the 
section 553 public notice and comment procedures. Appellants thus have no standing to 
assert Count I of the Complaint by reason of ‘procedural harm.’”); id. at 930. (“A 
substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the patent 
statutes, whether it be section 101, 102, 103, 112 or other section, does not fall within the 
usual interpretation of such statutory language.”). It is this second statement that has since 
been used by litigants in numerous cases seeking to circumscribe the Patent Office’s rule 
making authority. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 
590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The district court and the Board's legal errors stem 
from a failure to appreciate the consequences of the PTO's rulemaking authority. The PTO 
lacks substantive rulemaking authority.”). 
48 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
49 Id. at 1549. 
50 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
51 Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549 (quoting Atchison v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1994) (en 
banc), aff'd, 516 U.S. 152 (1996)) (“As the Seventh Circuit recently had occasion to note, 
however, ‘only statutory interpretations by agencies with rulemaking powers deserve 
substantial deference.’”); id. at 1549–50 (“As we have previously held, the broadest of the 
PTO's rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate 
regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does not grant the 
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.”); see also ANIMAL LEGAL 
DEFENSE FUND, 932 F.2d at 930. 
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rules, this was narrowly interpreted by the courts to only apply to procedural matters 
within the agency. 
III. ORIGINS OF POST GRANT REVIEW OF PATENTS 
 Congress instituted a new proceeding in 1980, the ex parte reexamination, 
to be administered by the Patent Office, because over the years a growing number 
of complaints were being levied at the United States patent system.52 In response, 
Congress and the Patent Office began to try and address two of the major criticisms:  
First, patents were being routinely granted for inventions that represented an 
advance in the arts that was not significant enough to justify the resulting monopoly 
as embodied in Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.;53 As 
the majority states: 
The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser conception 
of patents than the Constitution contemplates have been 
persistent. The Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, 
has looked with favor on the opportunity which the exercise of 
discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so it has 
placed a host of gadgets under the armour of patents-gadgets that 
obviously have had no place in the constitutional scheme of 
advancing scientific knowledge. A few that have reached this 
Court show the pressure to extend monopoly to the simplest of 
devices . . . . The patent involved in the present case belongs to 
this list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has 
spawned. The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this 
one has to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared 
invalid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system 
frequently departs from the constitutional standards which are 
supposed to govern.”); Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 542 (8th 
Cir. 1972) (quoting statement of district court judge in record on 
appeal: “I think you ought to tell your Attorney General, if he 
wants to look at something, he ought to look at that Patent Office. 
That has got to be the sickest institution that our Government has 
ever invented. It is just, as far as I can see, an attritional war 
between the patent applicant and the patent examiners, who 
apparently get paid on the piece work for how many patents they 
could put out. And you can examine for months some poor 
fellows that are out doing business and finally arrive at a price 
structure, and you might get an antitrust suit. But if you want to 
look, go back and look in your Patent Office and see what is 
                                                 
52Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is It Time for Corrective 
Surgery, or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 
229–30 (2003). 
53 SEE, E.G., Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156–
58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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happening to the Patent Office. I say that for the record and for 
posterity. That has got to be the weakest link in the competitive 
system in America.”54 
The second criticism addressed was that a large percentage of awarded 
patents were being invalidated in litigation.55 This first major attempt in 
1980 was under taken to address these issues by Congress resulting in the 
ability of third parties to raise the issue of a patent’s validity without filing 
a lawsuit. 56 However, the ability to challenge an existing patent was 
limited, because only ‘prior art’ invalidity and no other invalidating 
activity would be considered, and secondly, because the reexamination was 
essentially an ex parte proceeding.57 Therefore, there was still a lot of 
discord among the patent bar, and as such “reexamination, according to 
many, has failed”.58 In 1999, Congress then amended the act to add another 
post-issuance review proceeding—the inter partes reexamination.59 This 
amendment allowed the requesting third party to have some ability to 
participate in the proceeding after a reexamination had been instituted by 
the Patent Office.60 
 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was enacted in 2011.61 Three major 
                                                 
54 SEE, E.G., Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 156–
58 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
55 See, e.g., Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have been 
granted, improperly I think, and without adequate tests of invention by the Patent Office. 
But I doubt that the remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally 
strong passion in this Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is 
one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”). 
56 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (Dec. 12, 1980). 
57 See id. The patent office would only reexamine the issued patent based on the existence of 
prior art that was either an existing patent or printed publication at the time of invention. 
Additionally, a third party after filing the initial claim could no longer participate in the 
proceedings (i.e. they could not respond to any patentee arguments).  
58 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Administrative 
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 43 (1997) (stating that “a 
lingering debate has centered around” the question of what role the PTO should “play in 
regards to issued patents”). 
59 Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 4608(a), 113 Stat 1501 (Nov. 29. 1999). 
60 See id. The third-party requestor could now respond to the patentee’s arguments presented 
to the patent office. 
61 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16, 
2011). 
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changes were made by the America Invents Act: (1) moving from a first-to-invent 
system to a first invento- to-file system; (2) giving the Patent Office fee-setting 
authority; and (3) upgrading the administrative proceedings within the Patent 
Office, which can be used to challenge patent validity after it has issued62 Although 
formal review by the patent office of a patent that had already issued had been 
around since 1980 in the form of an ex parte reexamination,63 this process was 
expanded even further by the America Invents Act.64 The new proceedings included 
the post grant review, inter partes review, and covered business methods.  Of 
specific interest in this article is the inter partes review proceeding, which is 
typically initiated by a third party who makes a claim of invalidity on an existing 
patent.65  The Patent Office reviews the claim(s) of the third party and then makes 
an initial determination of whether or not to institute an inter partes review 
proceeding.66 Congress gave the Patent Office substantive rule-making authority 
under the America Invents Act regarding fee-setting67 and implementing the new 
review proceedings.68 
 
IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
 
 As the U.S. government has grown, so too has the need for Congress to 
delegate more authority to the executive branch to carry out its policies.  This 
transition was especially evident during the New Deal Era.69 At the same time, 
concerns about the substantive powers and policy objectives given to the executive 
                                                 
62 See generally ALAN J. KASPER ET AL., PATENTS AFTER THE AIA: EVOLVING LAW AND 
PRACTICE 1-6 (2016). 
63 Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (Dec. 12, 1980) (establishing a formal process for 
ex parte reexamination). 
64 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 
16, 2011). 
65 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2013). 
66 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2013). 
67 Memorandum from Bernard J. Knight, Jr., Gen. Counsel, USPTO, Patent Fee Setting (Feb. 
10, 2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/fee_setting 
_opinion.pdf (“[Section 10 of the America Invents Act] provides the [Patent Office] with the 
authority to set individual fees based on policy considerations.”). 
68 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2015). 
69 Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 207 (2016). 
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branch agencies began to surface.70 The lack of disclosure from executive branch 
agencies exacerbated concerns about insufficient oversight of agency decision-
making procedures.71  
Eventually, the Administrative Procedures Act72 was passed in 1946 after much 
debate.73 The purposes of the Act were to:  
(1) To require agencies to keep the public informed of their 
organization, procedures, and rules; (2) To provide for public 
participation in the informal rulemaking process; (3) To prescribe 
uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking and 
adjudicative proceedings, i.e., proceedings that are required by 
statute to be made on the record after an agency hearing; and (4) 
To restate the law of judicial review.74 
 
 The Administrative Procedures Act has set the standards under which 
agencies promulgate regulations, defined the scope of those regulations, and set 
forth the circumstances under which they are subjected to judicial review.75 Even in 
the early years of the Administrative Procedures Act, courts deferred to the agencies 
expertise and reversed agency decisions only rarely.76 Over time, the Administrative 
Procedures Act began to morph as judges made changes through judicial review and 
Congress would respond with changes when writing the procedural provisions for 
new agency statutes.77 Then, the Court’s decision in Chevron reset judicial review 
back to a position of general deference to administrative agencies.78 
 Interestingly, the courts have historically declined to give the Patent Office 
                                                 
70 Id. at 209. 
71 Id. at 209 (citing John Joseph Wallis, The Political Economy of New Deal Federalism, 29 
ECON. INQUIRY 510 (July 1991) (“When Congress asked Harry Hopkins, head of the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration in the early New Deal era, to explain how he 
made his decisions and to identify the criteria he used to allocate funds, he simply declined 
to answer.”). 
72 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2011). 
73 Elias, supra, note 69 at 211–12. 
74Jill Nylander, The Administrative Procedure Act, 85 MICH. B.J. 38, 39 (Nov. 2006). 
75 Id. 
76 Martin Shapiro, Golden Anniversary: The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, A, 19 
REGULATION 40, 42 (1996), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/379. 
77 Id. at 42-43 (This reflects the change in public perception regarding Administrative 
Agencies. “Once viewed as benevolent, political eunuchs in white coats, scientists came to 
be seen as part of ‘big science,’ an interest group with its hand out for big public funding and 
part of the military-industrial complex that President Eisenhower denounced.”). 
78 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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Chevron deference afforded to other administrative agencies, such as the EPA and 
FCC, without much explanation.79 However, the Supreme Court has on occasion 
chastised the Federal Circuit for substituting its interpretation of certain 
administrative rules and evidentiary standards in place of those of the Patent 
Office.80 In Dickinson, the Federal Circuit found that the Patent Office’s factual 
findings were “clearly erroneous.”81 The Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Circuit was not justified in substituting the court’s evidentiary standard for the 
Patent Office’s standard under the Administrative Procedures Act and remanded the 
case for rehearing using the agency’s standard.82  
 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the American Inventors Protection Act 
to reinforce that decision.83 The specific language used by Congress in the Act 
suggests that they intended to grant substantive rule making authority to the Patent 
Office.84 Even so, the Federal Circuit has continued to make the distinction between 
procedural and substantive rules and deciding the cases based on this distinction.85 
This distinction was anything but clear as illustrated by Tafas v. Doll.86 Judge Prost, 
writing for the majority, held that the rules in question were procedural.87 Judge 
Radar disagreed and said the rules were substantive.88 Judge Bryson opined that this 
distinction was not helpful and held only that the rules under discussion here were 
                                                 
79 Compare Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996), with Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
80 See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 165 (“Neither the Circuit nor its supporting amici, however, have explained 
convincingly why direct review of the PTO's patent denials demands a stricter fact-related 
review standard than is applicable to other agencies. Congress has set forth the appropriate 
standard in the [Administrative Procedures Act].”). 
83 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4711-4712, 113 Stat. 1501A-
552, at 1501A-572 to 1501A-575 (1999) (stating that, “establish[ing] regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, which--(A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office . . 
.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2012) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations to provide 
for the continued examination of applications for patent at the request of the applicant.”). 
84 See generally Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 831, 857–62 (2012). 
85 See, e.g., Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1354-56 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
86 Id. 
87 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (“While we do not purport to set forth a 
definitive rule for distinguishing between substance and procedure in this case, we conclude 
that the Final Rules challenged in this case are procedural.”), reh'g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
88 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1371 (Fed. Cir.) (Radar, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“The Final Rules are substantive. The Final Rules affect individual 
rights and obligations, and mark a startling change in existing law and patent policy.”), 
reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
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the sort congress had in mind when constructing the rule making statutes that applied 
to the Patent Office.89 The incongruous opinions penned in Tafas attracted the 
attention of the full circuit who agreed to rehear the case en banc.  However, the 
new Director of the Patent Office rescinded the rules in question before the 
rehearing, resulting in the court dismissing the appeal as moot.90 
 
A. Judicial Review of the Administrative Procedures Act 
 
 One of the seminal judicial decisions interpreting the Act was laid out in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.91  In Chevron, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated rules associated with the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.92 This required the EPA to institute a strict 
permitting scheme for “nonattainment” states who had not achieved the desired 
national air quality standards pursuant to previous legislation.93 In contention was 
the definition of the term ‘stationary source.’  Specifically, the EPA allowed a state 
to apply the term on a plantwide basis.94 Thus, a plant could add additional sources 
of pollution without going through the permitting process as long as the total 
pollution emitted from the plant remain unchanged.95  
 The first question addressed by the Chevron court was whether Congress 
had specifically spoken to the issue.  If Congress unambiguously spoke to the matter, 
that is the end of the analysis as neither an administrative body nor the courts may 
insert constructions which are contrary to clear legislative intent.96 However, the 
second question addresses when Congress has not spoken directly on the issue: Has 
the administrative agency promulgated a rule which is a reasonable interpretation of 
                                                 
89 Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1366 (Fed. Cir.) (Bryson, Circuit Judge, concurring) (“I do 
not think it necessary, or particularly helpful, to consider whether those regulations would 
be deemed ‘substantive,’ ‘interpretive,’ or ‘procedural’ . . . .”), reh'g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
90 Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
91 See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
92 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95–95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 
93 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981) (“[T]he 
courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject 
administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rule-
making, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that 
Congress sought to implement.”). 
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congressional intent?97 The Chevron court held that the EPA made a reasonable 
choice in defining ‘stationary source’ and any judgement as to whether it amounts 
to good policy or not must be dismissed.98 
 
V. WHAT IS THE PROPER CLAIM CONSTRUCTION STANDARD TO USE 
DURING AN INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCEEDING? 
 
 Another key point of tension in Cuozzo is whose claim construction 
standard is proper in an inter partes review; should it be the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard used by the Patent Office or the ‘as understood by those 
skilled in the art’ standard used by the courts? A discussion of the policies and 
history behind the establishment of each standard is necessary before turning to the 
Supreme Court decision in Cuozzo. 
 
A. The Patent Office Uses The Broadest Reasonable 
Interpretation Standard When Construing Claim Terms  
 For more than 100 years the Patent Office has used the broadest reasonable 
interpretation in claim construction during patent examination.99 This practice has 
continued uninterrupted since that time even though no patent statute has explicitly 
                                                 
97 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
98 Id. at 866 (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is 
a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a 
case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy 
choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy 
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not 
judicial ones.”); 
see also Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975) (“Congress . . . left to 
the States considerable latitude in determining specifically how the standards would be met. 
We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation . . . was ‘correct.’ . . . [W]e have no 
doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of 
Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.”); United States v. Shimer, 
367 U.S. 374, 381–82 (1961) (quoting Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108–09 
(1904) (“‘[W]here Congress has committed to the head of a department certain duties 
requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, his action thereon, whether it involve 
questions of law or fact, will not be reviewed by the courts unless he has exceeded his 
authority or this court should be of opinion that his action was clearly wrong.’”)); Shimer, 
367 U.S. at 383 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting 
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it 
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one 
that Congress would have sanctioned.”). 
99 Miel v. Young, 29 App. D.C. 481, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1907) (“This claim should be given the 
broadest interpretation which it will support, and we should not strive to import limitations 
from the specification to meet the exigencies of the particular situation in which the claim 
may stand at a given time.”). 
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stated whether the broadest reasonable interpretation should be used by the Patent 
Office or not.100 The purpose for using the broadest reasonable interpretation is to 
encourage patent applicants to draft narrowly.101 This has a two-fold result, first is 
to deny the patentee a monopoly on more knowledge than what was actually 
invented102 and second is to “apprise the public of what is still left open to them.”103 
Interestingly, the Patent Office promulgated a rule stating for the first time that this 
standard of claim construction was to be used during an inter partes review in 
response to the passage of the America Invents Act in 2011.104 
 
B. The Courts Use the “Ordinary Meaning as Understood by One of 
Ordinary Skill in the Art at the Time of the Invention” Standard in Claim 
Construction. 
 
 As a first principle, it is “the claims of a patent [that] define the invention 
to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.”105 It is the individual terms 
used when construing the claim that define the scope of the invention.106  
The terms are “generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.”107 Because 
inventors often use specific terminology related to the technological area in which 
they work, customary meaning refers to the meaning it would have to one of 
ordinary skill in the art.108 Furthermore, courts have held that inventors are able to 
define the claim terms in their specification which have a meaning different than 
their ordinary and customary meaning.109 These points were well stated in 
                                                 
100 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted 
sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890, 193 L. Ed. 2d 783 (2016), and 
aff'd sub nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 195 L. Ed. 2d 423 
(2016). 
101 See, e.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128-29 (2014). 
102 Id. at 2128–30. 
103 Id. at 2129 (quoting MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, 517 U.S. 370, 373 
(1996)); MCCLAIN V. ORTMAYER, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891). 
104 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”). 
105 Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004). 
106 See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to 
define the scope of the patented invention.”). 
107 Id. 
108 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
109 See, e.g., Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (“It is a well-established axiom in patent law that a patentee is free to be his or 
her own lexicographer and thus may use terms in a manner contrary to or inconsistent with 
one or more of their ordinary meanings.”) (citation omitted). 
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Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd.:110 
It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention 
through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is 
deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an 
understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have 
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field. The 
inventor's words that are used to describe the invention—the 
inventor's lexicography—must be understood and interpreted by 
the court as they would be understood and interpreted by a person 
in that field of technology. Thus the court starts the decision 
making process by reviewing the same resources as would that 
person, VIZ., the patent specification and the prosecution history. 
 
 Thus, the courts use the ‘as understood by those skilled in the art’ standard 
because they are tasked with resolving a specific controversy. Frequently, this 
dispute revolves around whether a particular invention falls within or out of the 
claim scope recited in the patent. Necessarily, the court needs to determine the exact 
scope of a claimed invention in order to give the inventor the benefits of a patent to 
which he is entitled by right, but no more. To err on either side of this would either 
deprive the individual of an earned right granted by the patent system or deprive the 
public of the ability to make, use, or sell an invention to which the patent holder had 
no right to exclude. In other words, if the courts used the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard (aside from greatly increasing the amount of litigation), this 
would unduly restrict a patentee’s rights to the invention and would give the public 
rights to knowledge that are otherwise within the scope of the invention.  
 
IV. CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES V. LEE 
 
A. Procedural history 
 
 Giuseppe A. Cuozzo applied for a patent on March 18, 2002.  The 
prosecution of the application continued until February 18, 2004 at which time a 
notice of allowance was issued by the Patent Office.111  More than 8 years had 
transpired before Garmin International, Inc. and Garmin USA, Inc. filed a petition 
for inter partes review on September 16, 2012 asserting claims 1-20 of U.S. Patent 
No. 6,778,074,112 owned by Cuozzo Speed Technologies, were invalid.   
 The Patent Trials and Appeal Board instituted an inter partes review on 
                                                 
110 MULTIFORM DESICCANTS, INC. V. MEDZAM, LTD., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
111 The prosecution history of the patent application can be found at, 
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair; select the ‘PATENT NUMBER’ radio button and 
search patent number ‘6,778,074’ (follow “Image File Wrapper” hyperlink). 
112 U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074. 
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January 9, 2013 because they determined that Garmin was reasonably likely to 
prevail on at least one claim of unpatentability.113 Specifically, the Patent Trials and 
Appeal Board denied the petition in part as to claims 1-9, 11-13, 15, 16, and 18-20, 
but granted review of claims 10, 14, and 17 on two grounds of unpatentability, 
novelty and obviousness.  The Patent Trials and Appeal Board rendered a decision 
on November 13, 2013, cancelling claims 10, 14, and 17.114   
 Briefly, the (‘074) patent claims an indicator and an associated method for 
showing a driver his current speed relative to the legal posted speed limit in a given 
area that is updated in real time.  This is accomplished either through a liquid crystal 
display showing both a driver’s speed and the current speed limit or through a 
movable needle indicating the driver’s current speed and a colored filter that is 
rotatable to show the current speed limit.  It is this second implementation, embodied 
in claims 10, 14, and 17 that were reviewed and ultimately cancelled.115  
 Cuozzo appealed the Patent Trials and Appeal Board decision to the US 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The Court of Appeals held that the Patent 
Trials and Appeal Board’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
                                                 
113 Garmin Int'l, Inc., No. IPR2012-00001, 2013 WL 5947691 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013). 
114 Garmin Int'l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No. IPR2012-00001, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1852 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2013). 
115 U.S. Patent No. 6,778,074, cls. 10, 14, and 17 states: 
 
10. A speed limit indicator comprising: 
a global positioning system receiver; 
a display controller connected to said global positioning 
system receiver, wherein said display controller adjusts 
a colored display in response to signals from said 
global positioning system receiver to continuously 
update the delineation of which speed readings are in 
violation of the speed limit at a vehicle’s present 
location; and 
a speedometer integrally attached to said colored display. 
. . . 
14. The speed limit indicator as defined in claim 10, 
wherein said colored display is a colored filter. 
. . . 
17. The speed limit indicator as defined in claim 14, 
wherein said display controller rotates said colored filter 
independently of said speedometer to continuously update 
the delineation of which speed readings are in violation of 
the speed limit at a vehicle’s present location. 
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was within their discretion and the decision to initiate the review was final and non-
appealable.116  Cuozzo appealed to the United States Supreme Court and certiorari 
was granted. 
 On appeal Cuozzo argued that the Patent Office improperly granted inter 
partes review at least in respect to claims 10 and 14, because Garmin failed to 
challenge those claims with specificity.117  Cuozzo also challenged the decision of 
the Patent Trials and Appeal Board to use the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard versus the standard employed by the courts to determine patentability.118  
 
B. The Majority’s Opinion Holds That the Patent Office’s 
Decision to Institute Inter Partes Review Is Not Reviewable 
First, in reviewing the Federal Circuit panel decision that the Patent Office’s 
institution of an inter partes review was final and non-appealable, the Supreme 
Court construed two provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.119  The 
first provision is in reference to the ability of Cuozzo to appeal the Patent Trials and 
Appeal Board’s decision to institute inter partes review.  The statute states, “No 
Appeal.—The determination by the Director [of the Patent Office] whether to 
institute inter partes review under this section shall be final and non-appealable.”120  
The second provision is regarding the Patent Office’s ability to promulgate 
regulations used in inter partes review.  The provision states, “The Director shall 
prescribe regulations-- establishing and governing inter partes review under this 
chapter and the relationship of such review to other proceedings under this title.”121 
Cuozzo argued review of claims 10 and 14 were improperly granted, because all 
challenged claims must be pleaded “with particularity” according to the statute.122 
The Patent Office disagrees and says a mere recitation of the same argument is not 
necessary when the claims are “all logically linked,” that the claims “rise and fall” 
together,123 and the same argument is “obviously implied.”124 Thus, while Cuozzo 
has a valid technical argument, logic dictates that if dependent claim 17 is found 
                                                 
116 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub 
nom. 
117 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016). 
118 Id. 
119 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112–29, Sept. 16, 2011, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011). 
120 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2015). 
121 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2015). 
122 35 U.S.C. § 312 (a)(3) (2015). 
123 See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F. 3d 1268, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
124 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016). 
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unpatentable then any claim that subsumes claim 17—claims 10 and 14 here—must 
be invalid as well.  “Claims which are broad enough to read on obvious subject 
matter are unpatentable even though they also read on nonobvious subject 
matter.”125 
 The majority in Cuozzo held—at a minimum—the language in the 
provision forbids an appeal that raises some minor statutory technical argument and 
nothing more.126  Furthermore, allowing review of the decision to institute inter 
partes review would undermine congressional intent,127 which specifically grants 
the Patent Office authority to re-examine already issued patents.128 The majority 
also points to other similar provisions and patent statutes to support their holding.129 
The Court unanimously holds that using the broadest reasonable claim construction 
during an inter partes review is a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s authority 
granted by Congress. 
 Next, Cuozzo argued that the provision requiring the Patent Office to give 
a claim “its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the 
patent in which it appears”130 is contrary to established law set by the courts which 
give claims their “ordinary meaning . . . as understood by a person of skill in the 
art.”131 However, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Patent Office had 
within its discretion the ability to use a broadest reasonable claim construction under 
35 U.S.C. section 316(a)(4).132 The Court relied upon Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and United States v. Mead Corporation as 
                                                 
125 Application of Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1972); see also Application of 
Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (C.C.P.A. 1972).  
126 35 U.S.C.  § 314(d) (2015) (stating that the determination by the [Patent Office] whether 
to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be FINAL AND 
NONAPPEALABLE); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2139–40. 
127 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140.  
128 Id. at 2139–40 (explaining that the statute seeks to “improve patent quality and restore 
confidence in the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents” (citing H.R. Rep., 
at 45, 48)); 157 Cong. Rec. 9778 (2011) (remarks of Rep. Goodlatte) (noting that inter partes 
review “screen[s] out bad patents while bolstering valid ones”). 
129 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (limiting appellate review to the “final written decision” (citing 
35 U.S.C. § 319)); § 312(c) (2006 ed.) (repealed) (the “determination” that a petition for inter 
partes REEXAMINATION “raise[s]” a “substantial new question of patentability” is “final 
and non-appealable”)); § 303(c) (2012 ed.); IN RE HINIKER CO., 150 F.3d 1362, 1367 
(C.A. Fed.1998) (“Section 303 ... is directed toward the [Patent Office's] authority to institute 
a reexamination, and there is no provision granting us direct review of that decision.”). 
130 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2016). 
131 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
132 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2015) (granting the Patent Office the authority to promulgate 
regulations governing inter partes review). 
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controlling precedent.133  
 Where the clear intent of Congress is articulated and no ambiguity exists 
the administrative agency has no discretion.134 However, when Congress leaves a 
gap to be filled, the court interprets this as giving the administrative agency authority 
to use reasonable means to carry out the intent of Congress.135 Because the statute 
does not explicitly tell the agency whether to use one standard of claim construction 
or another, Congress has implicitly authorized the agency to legislate a reasonable 
regulation.136 
 Cuozzo argued Congress intended for inter partes review to closely 
resemble a court proceeding and, therefore, should employ the same claim 
construction that is used by the courts—the Phillips standard.137 Cuozzo pointed the 
Court to the legislative history regarding the inter partes review statutes for 
support.138 The Court emphasized how inter partes review is less like a court action 
and more like an administrative proceeding.139 Furthermore, the Court found the 
purpose of inter partes review is not the same as district court litigation.140 
Specifically, Congress wanted to enable the Patent Office to reexamine a previous 
                                                 
133 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
134 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (1984). 
135 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218–19 (2001). 
136 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (citing United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“No statutory provision unambiguously directs the 
agency to use one standard or the other. And the statute ‘express[ly] . . . authoriz[es] [the 
Patent Office] to engage in the process of rulemaking’ to address that gap.”)). 
137 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016). 
138 Id. at 2143 (2016) (Inter partes review is a “quick and cost effective alternativ[e] to 
litigation.” (citing H.R. Rep. at 48))); id. at 46–47 (“The Act converts inter partes 
reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding.”); S.Rep. No. 110–
259, p. 20 (2008) (Inter partes review is “a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to 
district court litigation.”); 157 Cong. Rec. 3429–3430 (2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl) 
(“Among the reforms that are expected to expedite these proceedings [is] the shift from an 
examinational to an adjudicative model”).  
139 Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (quoting SIERRA CLUB V. E.P.A., 292 
F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Article III standing is not necessarily a requirement to 
appear before an administrative agency, once a party seeks review in a federal court, ‘the 
constitutional requirement that it have standing kicks in.’”)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. 
Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“[T]he burden of proof in inter partes review is different 
than in the district courts: In inter partes review, the challenger (or the Patent Office) must 
establish unpatentability “by a preponderance of the evidence”; in district court, a 
challenger must prove invalidity by “clear and convincing evidence”). 
140 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). 
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administrative decision without having to litigate the issue in district court.141 
Finally, the Court conceded this analysis does not shed any light on Congress’s 
intent regarding which standard should be applied during an inter partes review.142 
Thus, the correct standard to use remains ambiguous.143 
 This resulted in the Court reviewing the regulation only as to whether 
designating use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was reasonable or 
not.144 The Court held that it was a reasonable exercise of the Patent Office’s 
authority because first, using the broadest reasonable claim construction helps to 
ensure that an inventor does not draft too broadly and circumscribe too much 
knowledge which unfairly denies from the public the use of information not 
contained in the patent145 and secondly, the Patent Office’s long history of 
employing the broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction in agency 
determinations without congressional comment for not only reviewing patent 
applications, but also other related proceedings.146 
 Cuozzo responds with two arguments.  The first is that the process is unfair 
and points to the scarcity of successful claim amendments made during an inter 
partes review proceeding.  The Court rejects Cuozzo’s statistical argument and 
retorts, “these numbers may reflect the fact that no amendment could save the 
inventions at issue, I.E., that the patent should have never issued at all.”147 The 
Court noted that they did not consider whether the manner in which the Patent Office 
exercises its authority is compliant with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a),148 because Cuozzo 
did not explicitly raise this issue.149 
 Cuozzo’s second argument raises the issue that having two 
standards of claim construction, one for administrative proceedings and one in the 
courts, may result in inconsistent results and confusion.150 The Court agrees with 
                                                 
141 Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 
324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)) (“[I]nter partes review helps protect the public's ‘paramount 
interest in seeing that patent monopolies ... are kept within their legitimate scope.’”); see 
H.R. Rep., at 39–40 (Inter partes review is an “efficient system for challenging patents that 
should not have issued.”). 
142 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 2144–45. 
145 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012); NAUTILUS, INC. V. BIOSIG INSTRUMENTS, 
INC., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014); see also IN RE YAMAMOTO, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
146 See supra, notes 93–98 and accompanying text; Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 
S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2016). 
147 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2145. 
148 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2011) (“(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be--(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law”). 
149 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2146. 
150 Id. at 2146. 
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Cuozzo on the one hand that this is a possibility.151  On the other hand, this has long 
been the case in the United States patent system which provides two different tracks, 
one in the courts and one in the Patent Office, and consolidating the claim 
construction standard would prove difficult.152  
 
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion 
 
 Justice Thomas argued the holding in Chevron should be overturned and 
that “ambiguity in a statutory term is best construed as an implicit delegation of 
power to an administrative agency to determine the bounds of the law” is false.153  
Justice Thomas proposed revisiting Chevron and its descendants in an appropriate 
case.154  He concurred in full with the decision, but only on the grounds that it is 
compliant with 5 U.S.C. section 706(2)(A).155 
 
D. Justice Alito’s Dissent and Justice Sotomayor Joins 
 
 Justice Alito began with the strong presumption for judicial review.156 He 
agreed Congress has given the Patent Office considerable authority to promulgate 
its own rules regarding inter partes review.157 He disagreed congressional intent was 
to bar judicial review of whether the Patent Office exceeded its authority or not 
when instituting an inter partes review – the only limitation is that a challenge to the 
agency’s decision must be channeled through the agency’s final decision.158 
 The dissent points out that a number of statutory requirements need to be 
                                                 
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
153 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  
156 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2149–50 (2016) (Alito, J., 
dissenting in part, concurring in part); see Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 
1651 (2015) (“Congress rarely intends to prevent courts from enforcing its directives to 
federal agencies. For that reason, this Court applies a ‘strong presumption’ favoring judicial 
review of administrative action.”). 
157 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2148–49. 
158 Id. at 2149. 
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satisfied in order for the Patent Office to institute an inter partes review.159 The 
dissent also pointed to LINDAHL V. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 
to illustrate the strong presumption of judicial review.160 In Lindahl, the Court held 
that even though congressional intent was repeated three times in one sentence 
regarding finality, the statute could be read as final only to factual determinations 
and not to questions of law.161 The dissent notes that Congress employs far stronger 
language when it intends to prohibit judicial review altogether.162 Previous cases 
have held that final agency decisions, while not reviewable at the time (no 
interlocutory appeals), are nonetheless still subject to judicial review upon final 
judgment.163 The dissent emphasizes that this judicial review upon a final judgment 
of agency decisions is standard practice, including review of earlier agency 
                                                 
159 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2015) (stating that a petition must, “identif[y], in writing 
and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each 
claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”), 
and 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1), (b) (2015) (A petition may not be advanced by a party who either 
filed an action claiming invalidity or was itself sued for infringement more than one year 
earlier.), and 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2015) (The petition must show that, “there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged 
in the petition.”), with Brief for Respondent at 16, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. 
Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2016 WL 1298034, at *16 (“By barring judicial review of all 
institution decisions, § 314(d) does not allow the Board to ignore the limits on its authority. 
Even when Congress intends to bar judicial review of an agency decision, this Court and 
others have recognized ‘an implicit and narrow exception’ for ‘claims that the agency 
exceeded the scope of its delegated authority or violated a clear statute mandate.’  Achates, 
803 F.3d at 658–59 . . . . This exception has no application here, however, because 
requirements such as § 312's ‘particularity’ rule are not clear statutory limits on the Board's 
authority to declare patent claims unpatentable. These requirements are instead claims-
processing rules that speak to the petitioner's procedural obligations, not the Board's 
adjudicative power.”). 
160 Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768 (1985). 
161 See id. at 779. 
162 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016) (“‘[W]hen Congress 
intends to bar judicial review altogether, it typically employs language far more 
unambiguous and comprehensive,’ giving as an example a statute that made an agency 
decision ‘final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law or 
fact’ and ‘not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by 
mandamus or otherwise.’” (quoting Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 779–80 
& n. 13 (1985))). 
163 See MOHAWK INDUS., INC. V. CARPENTER, 558 U.S. 100, 105 & n.1, 109 
(2009) (agreeing with decisions holding that attorney-client privilege rulings are 
“nonappealable” because “post judgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of 
litigants”); COOPERS & LYBRAND V. LIVESAY, 437 U.S. 463, 469, 472 & n.17 
(1978) (describing an order denying class certification as “nonappealable” but noting that it 
“is subject to effective review after final judgment.”). 
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decisions that were not reviewable at the time.164 In contrast, the majority analogized 
to cases in other contexts where the court has held that review of preliminary 
decisions are unreviewable.165 Justice Alito countered the majority employs the 
wrong analogy.166  
Despite the general presumption for judicial review, Justice Alito 
acknowledged that review may not be appropriate in every case.167 He went on to 
write that although Cuozzo may have ultimately failed, due to lack of any prejudice 
the decision had on his case, the perceived weakness in Cuozzo’s suit should not bar 
review by a court.168 By not allowing review, he argued the Court has set up the 
potential for unfairness to the patentee.169 For example, if the Patent Office does not 
follow the statutes when instituting inter partes review or any of the other post grant 
proceedings, the majority decision in Cuozzo makes this unreviewable.170 He opined 
this surely could not have been Congress’s intent.171 
 
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AFTER CUOZZO 
 
 The result after Cuozzo is a continuation of the slow trend of granting the 
Patent Office more rule-making authority especially relating to activities carried out 
within the agency itself. This is discussed extensively below. Another alternative is 
                                                 
164 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2011) (“A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling 
not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”); 15A 
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3905.1, pp. 
250, 252 (2d ed. 1992) (“[T]he general rule that an appeal from final judgment ... permits 
review of all rulings that led up to the judgment” and “[t]he variety of orders open to review 
on subsequent appeal from a final judgment is enormous.”). 
165 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“The grand jury 
gets to say—without any review, oversight, or second-guessing—whether probable cause 
exists to think that a person committed a crime.” (quoting Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 
1090, 1097–98 (2014))). 
166 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 & n.7 (2016) (“[The majority] 
draws the wrong analogy for this case. Cuozzo's complaint is that the petition for inter 
partes review did not articulate its challenge to certain patent claims with adequate 
particularity. This is more akin to an argument that an indictment did not sufficiently allege 
an offense and provide notice of the charges against the defendant, which is reviewable 
after trial and judgment.”); Id. at n.7 (overturning a conviction based on the insufficiency of 
the indictment (citing United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612–613 (1882))). 
167 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2011) (“[T]he court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited 
by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”). 
168 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. 
170 Id.   
171 Id.  
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an almost complete deference given to the Patent Office under Chevron as long as 
the Patent Office’s interpretation is compliant with 5 U.S.C.     § 706. This possibility 
is addressed briefly below.172  
 
A. Will Courts Grant Complete Deference to the Patent Office Going 
Forward? 
 There are strong arguments that Cuozzo establishes the precedent for 
almost complete deference. In other contexts, Chevron deference has been widely 
applied giving agencies broad discretion in interpreting congressional intent.173 This 
discretion has been extended to apply even where the court has already spoken on 
the matter.174 It has been argued that the fundamental reason why courts should defer 
to agency discretion is because Congress has told them to do so.175 Nonetheless, this 
broad discretion raises some important separation of powers questions and suggests 
that it is the administrative agency who is the final arbiter to say what the law is.176 
Chevron deference has even been suggested to give agencies authority similar to 
McCulloch v. Maryland to do as they please as long their interpretation of 
                                                 
172 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
173 See, e.g., Luminant Generation Co. LLC v. U.S. EPA, 714 F.3d 841, 852–53 (5th Cir. 
2013) (using the two step analysis under Chevron held that congress didn’t speak directly to 
the issue and the agency’s interpretation of congressional intent was permissible); 
VERIZON COMMC’NS INC. V. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 468 (2002) (‘[T]he incumbents have 
not met their burden of showing unreasonableness to defeat the deference [under Chevron] 
due the FCC.”). 
174 In AT&T CORP. V. PORTLAND, the Ninth Circuit held that cable modem service is a 
“telecommunications service.” 216 F.3d 871, 878 (2002). The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) then made a declaratory ruling which determined it had “appropriately 
classified [broadband cable modem service] as an ‘information service’ [that] does not 
contain a distinct telecommunications service.” In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed 
Access to Internet over Cable and Other Facilities (Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling), 17 
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4847 (2002).  The Ninth Circuit subsequently heard the appeal for the 
declaratory ruling and based its holding on stare decisis from Portland. The Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit in Nat'l Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs. The Court said that even if ‘telecommunications service’ was the best reading of the 
statute, the Commissioner’s interpretation is still entitled to Chevron deference if it is a 
reasonable interpretation. Furthermore, “A court's prior construction of a statute trumps an 
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision 
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency discretion.” 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2690–91 (2005). 
175 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 196–98 (2006) (stating 
that other proposed reasons such as administrative experts being able to interpret 
congressional intent better than judges; agency decisions require policy judgments and are 
better suited for the political rather than the judicial branches of government; or executive 
interpretations should be given deference based on a separation of powers argument, have 
been displaced by the simple statement, because congress has told the judiciary to give 
deference, they should do so). 
176 Contra Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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congressional intent is reasonable.177 Justice Antonin Scalia once opined, “I tend to 
think, however, that in the long run Chevron will endure and be given its full scope 
. . . because it more accurately reflects the reality of government, and thus more 
adequately serves its needs.”178 
However, Chevron is not without its critics, indicating there is at least some 
pushback to agency deference. One does not need to look any further than Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence in Cuozzo.179 Justice Thomas has been a vocal critic of 
Chevron and the cases decided based on its doctrine.180 Still others have questioned 
the prudence of Chevron as well.181 Given the historical precedent set by the past 
practice of the Federal Circuit to interpret the substantive patent laws,182 any 
deference given to the Patent Office will be limited to the new post-grant review 
proceedings.183  Congress would need to expressly tell the courts if its intent is to 
change this and determine that it should also defer to the agency when interpreting 





                                                 
177 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006); McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 353 (1819) (“The power to establish such a corporation is implied, 
and involved in the grant of specific powers in the constitution; because the end involves 
the means necessary to carry it into effect. A power without the means to use it, is a nullity. 
. . . [T]he constitution . . . expressly gives to congress the power ‘to make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers . . . or in any 
department or officer thereof.”). 
178 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 520 (1989). 
179 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2148 (2016) (Thomas, concurring). 
180 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213–25 (2015) (Thomas, 
concurring) (“This line of precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check 
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the 
Framers sought to prevent.”). 
181 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Is CHEVRON's Game Worth the Candle? Burning 
Interpretation at Both Ends, in LIBERTY'S NEMESIS 57, 69 (D. Reuter & J. Yoo eds., 2016) 
(“Perhaps the best course at this point is to scrap the Chevron framework and return to the 
terms laid out in the APA’s Section 706.”); DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE 
SUPREME COURT, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 7 (2016) 
(“[I]nstead of fulfilling one of the highest aims of civil society—providing a remedy for 
unlawful government conduct—the Supreme Court betrays that lofty aspiration and clothes 
the denial of a remedy in a technical legal doctrine permitting the executive officials who 
may have committed an unlawful act to escape judicial accountability.”).  
182 See discussion supra Section II. 
183 See discussion supra Section III. 
184 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 – 103 (2012). 
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B. The Patent Office Gains a Small Foothold Toward the Deference 
Accorded to Other Administrative Agencies 
 
 The reading of Cuozzo results in a continuation of the slow trend of 
deference granted to the Patent Office. Historical practice has been for the courts 
not to accede deference to the Patent Office to the same extent as other agencies.185 
The courts by and large have retained their claim to reviewing Patent Office 
decisions and reversing when they conflict with the court’s interpretation of the 
patent statutes—with some notable exceptions.186 Cuozzo continues this slow trend 
by explicitly holding that Chevron deference is controlling.187  
 However, this ruling should not be seen as setting a new standard for court 
deference to the Patent Office; deference will remain dissimilar to that given to other 
government agencies. A narrowly construed application of Cuozzo to future cases 
is the result. First, the facts in Cuozzo lent themselves to defeat. Axiomatically, if a 
dependent claim is invalidated because it is not novel, then by definition any claim 
subsuming the dependent claim must also be invalid due to lack of novelty.  It is 
hard to see how Cuozzo was prejudiced based on the appeal presented; even the 
dissent made specific reference to the weakness of Cuozzo’s arguments.188 Thus, 
not only was prejudice against Cuozzo regarding institution of inter partes review 
difficult to find, but so also was prejudice regarding the Patent Office’s use of the 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard. While a patent claim could at least 
theoretically be valid using the court’s ‘as understood by those skilled in the art’ 
standard, but invalid using the Patent Office’s broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard, this would be a rare instance. It is most likely that Cuozzo’s claim would 
have been invalidated even using the court’s less stringent standard. 
 However, the dissent is writing with an eye toward future cases and asks, 
“[If a Patent Office decision] grossly exceed[s] the Patent Office's authority and 
would be manifestly prejudicial to the patent owner, [could] Congress really have 
intended to shield such shenanigans from judicial scrutiny?”189 The majority 
emphasizes their analysis is employed only when the decision by the Patent Office 
to institute inter partes review is closely tied to those corresponding patent 
                                                 
185 See, e.g., In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see Sarah Tran, Patent 
Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 616 (2012) (“[The Federal Circuit] has assumed 
exclusive responsibility for making substantive interpretations of the Patent Act.”); Sapna 
Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2011) (“The 
Federal Circuit treats appeals from patent agencies differently than those from non-patent 
agencies. The Federal Circuit has granted Chevron or the lesser Skidmore deference to 
decisions from all of its non-patent agencies. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has historically 
chosen not to defer to agencies on issues of patent law.”). 
186 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (“[T]he Federal Circuit must use the 
framework set forth in [5 U.S.C.A. § 706].”). 
187 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016). 
188 Id. at 2154 (“Assuming that Cuozzo must show prejudice from the error it alleges, it is 
hard to see how Cuozzo could do so here. . . . But any perceived weakness in the merits of 
Cuozzo's appeal does not mean that such issues are unworthy of judicial review.”). 
189 Id. at 2155. 
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statutes.190 Further, if due process or other constitutional issues are raised by a future 
litigant, this holding would not impede judicial review of such a case.191 Thus, the 
holding in Cuozzo is quite narrow. 
 Limiting the effect of the Cuozzo decision even further is the fact that the 
Court used the rule-making authority granted by Congress cabined within the post-
grant review patent statutes.192 The Patent Office’s rule-making ability has 
historically been limited to only procedural matters. For the first time, Congress has 
granted the Patent Office substantive rule-making authority, meaning they can use 
certain policies identified by Congress193 to promulgate their own rules regarding 
these post-grant review proceedings and certain other proceedings.194 This same 
rule-making authority has not been extended to the other patent statutes which 
would threaten the holdings in thousands of cases that have interpreted the core 
patent statutes establishing patentability—namely, sections 101, 102, 103, and 
112.195  
C. Would the Court Defer to the Patent Office when interpreting Section 
102? 
 For example, prior to the America Invents Act, section 102(b) of the patent 
statutes would bar a patent from issue if the invention was ‘on sale.’196 Case law has 
already interpreted the on-sale bar to include sales that involve non-public informing 
uses.197 However, when Congress rewrote section 102 for the America Invents Act, 
they changed the statutory language.198 The Patent Office has penned an opinion 
                                                 
190 Id. at 2141. 
191 Id. at 2141–42 (2016) (“Thus, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we do not 
categorically preclude review of a final decision where . . . there is a due process problem 
with the entire proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the agency to act outside its 
statutory limits. . . . Such “shenanigans” may be properly reviewable in the context of § 319 
and under the Administrative Procedure Act, which enables reviewing courts to “set aside 
agency action” that is “contrary to constitutional right,” “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,” 
or “arbitrary [and] capricious.”). 
192 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2015). 
193 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2015) (“(b) Considerations.--In prescribing regulations under this 
section, the Director shall consider the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the 
integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of 
the Office to timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.”). 
194 Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 640–44 (2012). 
195 See id. at 615. 
196 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1952) (“[T]he invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or ‘on sale’ in this country, more than 
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.”) (emphasis 
added). 
197 See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 
(2d Cir. 1946) (“[I]t is a condition upon an inventor's right to a patent that he shall not 
exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself 
with either secrecy, or legal monopoly.”). 
198 35 U.S.C.A. § 102, supra, note 5. 
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that the ‘on sale’ bar now only applies to inventions that are publically informing 
and does not apply to sales that do not teach the public how to practice the 
invention.199 Thus, in the Patent Office’s opinion, Metalizing Engineering is no 
longer good law because the sale in that case did not disclose to the public how the 
invention was made. 
 The courts are likely to give little if any weight to the Patent Office’s 
opinion even under Cuozzo. First, as previously discussed, the historical practice 
has been for the federal circuit to interpret the patent statutes regarding substantive 
rules and only to give deference when the Patent Office interprets a procedural 
matter that takes place within the Patent Office. Second, the issue of whether or not 
an invention was ‘on sale’ only comes up in litigation.200 Not only does the Patent 
Office not have any experience in adjudicating these cases, but also would not have 
ruled on any cases that, at least arguably, the court would need to give deference. 
Lastly, when Congress passed the America Invents Act, the only substantive rule 
making authority conferred to the Patent Office was in regards to the post grant 
review proceedings.201 Congress could have explicitly extended this authority to the 
other patent statutes as well if it had intended to do so. Therefore, the courts are the 
appropriate interpreters of the new section 102 patent statute—not the Patent Office.  
 Based on policy arguments, the courts will not overturn Metallizing 
Engineering and will continue to hold that non-informing public sales also bar 
patentability.202 The courts have interpreted the patent statutes to require a decision 
by an inventor early on to either apply for a patent or to designate the invention as 
a trade secret. This is to prevent an inventor from extending the right to exclude 
others from practicing the invention beyond the statutory limit of 20 years. The 
courts have consistently held that this is the primary reason that patents are denied 
when an applicant has commercialized its invention outside the grace period.203 
 
D. The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Should Not Be Used in an Inter 
                                                 
199 MPEP § 2152.02(d) (“The phrase ‘on sale’ in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) is treated as having 
the same meaning as ‘on sale’ in pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b), except that the sale must make 
the invention available to the public.”) (emphasis added). 
200 See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 
(2d Cir. 1946). 
201  35 U.S.C. §§ 300 – 329 (2012). 
202 See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1370, n.11 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“A primary rationale of the on-sale bar is that publicly offering a product 
for sale that embodies the claimed invention places it in the public domain, regardless of 
when or whether actual delivery occurs.”). The Helsinn Court explained that requiring the 
details of the claimed invention be publicly disclosed before the on-sale bar is triggered 
“would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to 
those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.” Id. at 1369 (citing 
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829)). 
203 See, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 520 
(2d Cir. 1946); The Driven-Well Cases, 123 U.S. 267, 274 (1887).  
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Partes Review Proceeding 
The Patent Office’s use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
during an inter partes review proceeding is not a reasonable interpretation of 
Congressional intent under Chevron. When a statute is ambiguous, any 
administrative rule applying the statute must be a reasonable interpretation of 
Congressional intent.204 Otherwise, it is invalid. The broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard has historically been used during the pendency of a patent 
application in front of the Patent Office where the claims are amended in an iterative 
process. The use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard when construing 
claims has a two-fold purpose. First, it is to eliminate any ambiguity in the claim 
language so that the public may understand exactly what knowledge is protected by 
the patent claims and what remains open to them.  Secondly, the purpose is to limit 
the scope of the invention to only encompass what the inventor actually created—
and no more. These overriding considerations are in place to protect the public and 
any perceived injury to the patent applicant is alleviated by his ability to amend the 
claims.  
This is analogous to the specificity requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 112. An 
invention needs to be described completely and with specificity such that a person 
of ordinary skill in the art could make and use the invention. The patent system is a 
compromise designed to incentivize the invention process where an inventor 
receives the right to exclude others from practicing the invention in exchange for 
disclosing the knowledge of the invention to the public. It is this disclosure by the 
inventor to the public that is deemed by Congress to be worthy of the social costs 
associated with granting an inventor a monopoly in the invention even if for a 
limited time. However, Congress has explicitly allowed a patent to be reviewed 
during an inter partes review with respect to sections 102 or 103 only—not 101 or 
112. Implicit in this decision is that any deficiencies with respect to those sections 
should have already been addressed and will give deference to the Patent Office’s 
initial determination regarding those sections. Therefore, issues within those 
sections can only be raised in district court. 
Similarly, any issues arising from using the broadest reasonable 
interpretation standard should already be addressed by the time the patent is 
challenged in an inter partes review proceeding. It is difficult to understand how a 
patent, that is challenged eight years after it has been issued, in an inter partes review 
furthers the public interest of removing ambiguity from the language or limiting the 
scope of the invention through the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard. That is not to say that if prior art is introduced that reads on the claim the 
claims should not be limited, only that using the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard is not the appropriate mechanism to achieve this. Any claim scope already 
determined to be patentable using the broadest reasonable interpretation, similar to 
section 112 determinations, should be given the same deference as a previously 
adjudicated agency decision. Thus, the Patent Office’s use of the broadest 
                                                 
204 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1966); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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reasonable interpretation during inter partes review is not a reasonable interpretation 
of Congressional intent. The Patent Office should employ the standard used by the 
courts, “as understood by a person of skill in the art.”205 
Instead, in Cuozzo, the Patent Office essentially raised the issue de novo 
during the inter partes review proceeding and gave no weight to their own examiners 
previous decision. As already discussed, the use of the broadest reasonable 
interpretation does not further the public interests after the patent has already issued. 
In fact, it undermines confidence in the Patent Office when a determination is made 
by an administrative agent (patent examiner) and then given no deference within the 
same agency. The use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard during an 
inter partes review additionally places an undue hardship on the patentee. Again, the 
purpose of using the broadest reasonable interpretation standard is to encourage an 
applicant to remove ambiguous language and narrow the claim scope to only cover 
the invention that was created through an iterative process. This iterative process is 
absent in an inter partes review and thus the patentee only gets one chance to amend 
his claims by motion to the Patent and Trademark Administration Board. The record 
to date shows that it is not much of a chance at that. Because the unnecessary 
burdens placed on a patentee substantially outweigh any benefit to the public by 
using the broadest reasonable interpretation during an inter partes review, the Patent 
Office should instead employ the “as understood by one of skill in the art” standard 
used by courts during an inter partes review proceeding.206 
 
E. Two Different Outcomes in Different Settings 
 
 The court concedes the fact that two different outcomes are possible, one 
outcome within the Patent Office and a different outcome in district court.207 
However, the Court fails to address the issues raised by this scheme. The first issue 
is the inherent unfairness experienced by the patentee discussed above. The second 
issue is the potential for excess litigation.208  Having even the potential for different 
outcomes in different forums encourages forum shopping and other undesirable 
behaviors by litigants. The last issue is the potential for economic dislocation. 
 
                                                 
205 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016). 
206 Id. at 2139. 
207 Id. at 2146 (2016) (“We recognize that [the possibility of different outcomes] is so. This 
possibility, however, has long been present in our patent system, which provides different 
tracks—one in the Patent Office and one in the courts—for the review and adjudication of 
patent claims. As we have explained above, inter partes review imposes a different burden 
of proof on the challenger. These different evidentiary burdens mean that the possibility of 
inconsistent results is inherent to Congress' regulatory design.”). 
208 STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG. 2D SESSION, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE 
PATENT SYSTEM (1958) (Fritz Machlup) (noting that two different standards applied in 
different forums will likely greatly increase litigation). 
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VIII. THE COURT IN CUOZZO GOT IT WRONG 
 
A. Because legislative intent was not ambiguous, the Court should not have 
employed Chevron to decide the case. 
 
Congress clearly stated in the legislative history that its intent was that 
post-grant review proceedings were to be more like litigation in court rather than 
historical adjudications performed solely within the agency.  
 
B. The Court should have ruled in favor of Cuozzo based on Administrative 
Law principles 
 
The Court all but says explicitly that if Cuozzo would have argued the case 
on administrative law grounds, the case would have come out differently. The Court 
says, “Cuozzo does not contend that the decision not to allow its amendment is 
‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious,’ or ‘otherwise [un]lawful,’”209 in reference to the Patent 
Office denying Cuozzo’s attempt to amend the claims. This applies equally well to 
Cuozzo not raising the same issue in regards to the Patent Office’s decision to 
institute inter partes review regarding claims 10 and 14.210  
Even the majority agreed non-reviewable decisions can be reviewed if it 
raises any constitutional issue.211 Just as importantly, the Court has held that 
agencies must be constrained to making decisions within their jurisdictional purview 
and that agency discretion does not apply when they act outside of their 
jurisdiction.212 In Cuozzo, when the Patent Office instituted inter partes review of 
claims 10 and 14, they acted outside of their jurisdictional authority and therefore 
had no discretion to institute review of those claims. The statute states, “[t]he 
Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director 
determines that the information presented in the petition . . . .”213 The statute clearly 
limits claims and issues to be limited to those raised in the petition. The Patent 
Office does not have any jurisdictional authority to raise issues outside of those 
presented in the petition. If Congress had wanted the Patent Office to be able to raise 
issues outside of the four corners of the petition, it would have said so. 
 
 
                                                 
209 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(a) (1966). 
210 Id. at 2156. 
211 Id. at 2141-42. 
212 See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 544 (1988) (“The agency has no 
discretion to deviate from [] mandated procedure. . . . When a suit charges an agency with 
failing to act in accord with a specific mandatory directive, the discretionary function 
exception does not apply.”). 
213 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2011). 
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 The decision in Cuozzo establishes, at least regarding the post-grant review 
of patent proceedings, that the courts will defer to the Patent Office’s interpretation 
of congressional intent as long as its interpretation is reasonable. This has not been 
extended and is unlikely to be in the near future to the core statutes regarding 
patentability-sections 101, 102, 103, and 112. The Court rightly points out that 
Congress has constructed the patent statutes in this way and the Court should not 
substitute their judgment in its place. Although there are good arguments as to why 
this may be a good rule, there are also strong arguments against. The Court seems 
to be conceding that an administrative agency is a better ‘judge’ in interpreting 
congressional intent.214  The Court does not seem to acknowledge the inherent 
problems of improper influences that may present themselves that are unrelated to 
underlying congressional policy considerations or that compel an agency to not keep 
fidelity to the Constitution such as concerns about retaining influence and power as 
an agency, political pressures outside the scope of the statute in question, or denying 
substantive due process to applicants in the name of efficiency. Effectively 
relegating administrative rules to rational basis review by courts of interpretive 
questions seems to defer to the agencies the power to say what the law is and only 
the underlying statute circumscribes that interpretation.  If that interpretation is 







                                                 
214 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“In 
these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of 
manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is 
technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned 
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to 
accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by 
these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at 
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for 
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not 
consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on 
either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the 
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